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The construction and opening in May 2018 of the Crimean Bridge, which connects the territo-
ry of the Russian Federation with the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, has contributed to 
a worsening of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the Sea of Azov. Since April 2018, Russians have 
halted merchant ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch, which is greatly limiting the opera-
tion of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s actions are affecting Ukraine’s economy in 
that they make the export of goods that account for a major portion of Ukraine’s state budget 
revenue increasingly difficult. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture, total financial losses due to shipping limitations stand at US$ 20–40 million annually. 
Russia’s activity in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch seems to confirm Moscow’s ambi-
tions to make this basin a fully Russian-controlled internal area. Increased concentration of the 
Russian armed forces near the Crimean Bridge proves that this piece of infrastructure is of stra-
tegic importance for the Russian Federation. Access to the Sea of Azov and control of the ships 
sailing through the Strait of Kerch enables Russia to exert economic blackmail on Ukraine. The 
measures Russia has launched are of a permanent nature and are also intended to exacerbate 
Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. In this way, the Russian leadership is trying to influence 
the public mood in the southern part of the Donbas (which is controlled by Kyiv) to persuade the 
local residents that any further confrontation with Russia would be senseless.
Detailed checks by the Border Service  
of the FSB 
The rising tension between Russia and Ukraine 
in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch is yet 
another phase of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict 
that followed the annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula by Russia. In late March 2018, Ukrain-
ian border guards halted the “Nord” fishing 
cutter that sailed under the Russian flag. Mem-
bers of its crew were arrested and sentenced 
for crossing the border illegally. Russia used this 
incident as a pretext to accuse Ukraine of using 
‘state-sponsored piracy’1. According to Russia, 
Ukraine had no right to halt the vessel because 
an agreement is in force regarding cooper-
ation in using the Sea of Azov and the Strait 
of Kerch. It was signed in 2003 and ratified by 
parliaments of the two countries in April 2004. 
The agreement stipulates that the basin should 
be considered as an internal sea of both states 
and that Ukrainian and Russian merchant ships 
1 Entering the peninsula through border points located in 
Ukrainian-controlled areas is the only method of cross-
ing the administrative border with Crimea legally that 
Kyiv recognises.
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and warships should be free to sail there2. The 
agreement also contained an announcement 
that a border will be delimited both in the Sea 
of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch. However, 
negotiations regarding this issue, which have 
been ongoing since 2003, have brought no re-
sult because of Russia blocking this process. 
In its reaction to the arrest of the Russian fish-
ing cutter, Russia threatened to block the move-
ment of Ukrainian vessels through the Strait of 
Kerch, which would considerably disrupt the 
operation of commercial sea ports in Berdiansk, 
Mariupol and Henichesk. This plan was put 
into practice in late April 2018, when the mar-
itime border service of the FSB began to halt 
and thoroughly inspect merchant ships sailing 
to and from Ukrainian sea ports. Some of the 
ships were halted for more than 24 hours and 
some were targeted repeatedly. The Russian of-
ficials justified these measures through security 
reasons connected with terrorist threats. Russia 
intensified its actions in mid-May 2018, when 
military exercises were announced. Under the 
exercises carried out in the Sea of Azov, an 
area of around 2000 sq. kilometres comprising 
Ukrainian territorial waters near the port in Ber-
diansk, as well as other maritime areas, was ful-
ly closed for shipping. Inspections performed 
by Russian services continue, even though the 
exercises have officially ceased.
The inspections that have now been ongoing for 
three months resulted in the halting of around 
150 ships owned by both Ukrainian and foreign 
2 Договір між Україною та Російською Федерацією про 
співробітництво у використанні Азовського моря 
і Керченської протоки, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/643_205 
companies operating in Ukrainian sea ports. 
Losses the carriers suffered as a result of Rus-
sia’s actions are estimated at US$ 5000–15000 
daily, depending on the size of the ship and the 
duration of the inspection. As a consequence, 
some ship owners have withdrawn from coop-
eration with Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov 
and decided to redirect their vessels to Black 
Sea ports. The FSB’s actions are also causing di-
rect financial losses for Ukrainian sea ports that 
have been forced to suspend their operations. 
The drop in commercial traffic caused the sea 
port in Mariupol to fully suspend its operations 
for several days in early June. In response to 
Russia’s actions, Ukraine announced its plan 
to carry out military exercises along the Ukrain-
ian coast of the Sea of Azov between 1 June 
and 1 September 2018. In this way, the Ukrain-
ian side is trying to prevent the border service 
of the FSB from coming anywhere near the 
Ukrainian sea ports and continuing to halt mer-
chant ships operating there.
The bridge of special importance
The bridge over the Strait of Kerch is another im-
portant problem for the operation of Ukrainian 
ports in the Sea of Azov. Its construction and 
later the opening of its road traffic section in 
May 2018 considerably disrupted the movement 
of merchant ships. The assembly of the bridge’s 
arches in August and September 2017 halted 
the movement of all vessels through the strait, 
which – according to Ukraine – exposed the 
country to losses of around US$ 190 million3. 
3 According to the government in Kyiv, the timing of the 
strait’s blockade, which had neither been consulted with 
the Ukrainian side nor announced by Russians, was se-
lected intentionally because this is when Ukrainian com-
mercial ports in the Sea of Azov record peak volumes 
of most goods, in particular grain which is Ukraine’s 
major export. А. Купцова, И это очень страшно для 
Мариуполя, – замминистра о Керченском мосте, 
‘Обозреватель’, 6 July 2017, https://www.obozrevatel.
com/finance/economy/54917-mariupolyu-i-tak-ne-slad-
ko-a-tut-esche-novyie-trudnosti-zamministra.htm
The rising tension between Russia and 
Ukraine in the Sea of Azov and in the 
Strait of Kerch is yet another phase of 
the Russian–Ukrainian conflict.
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Moreover, in contrast to Russia’s initial state-
ments, the construction of the facility has 
caused a limitation of the size of vessels al-
lowed to sail through the strait. At present, ves-
sels measuring more than 33 metres in height 
and 160 metres in length are excluded from 
sailing through the strait. In this way, Panamax 
type ocean-going ships have been prevented 
from sailing there, which translated into finan-
cial losses suffered by the Ukrainian industrial 
sector. According to data compiled by the ad-
ministration of the Mariupol sea port, in 2016 
Panamax type ships accounted for 23% of all 
types of ships (144 vessels) that used this port 
and generated 43% of the volume of com-
modities transported in this port in that year. 
The necessity of renting several smaller ships 
instead of one larger ship has raised the cost 
of transportation, thereby reducing the attrac-
tiveness of Ukrainian ports and of their exports 
(due to a hike in the price of insurance of ships 
and their cargo, caused by the risk arising from 
operating in an unstable region threatened by 
military action). It should be noted that these 
limitations are of no particular importance for 
the operation of Russian ports located in the 
eastern part of the Sea of Azov. The average 
water depth in this part of the basin is 5 metres, 
which generates natural limitations for vessels 
operating there. The water depth in the ports 
of Berdiansk and Mariupol, on the other hand, 
is more than 8 metres, which enables ships with 
a much greater tonnage to use these ports.
The Mariupol sea port administration estimates 
that the limitations connected with the bridge 
construction have caused the trade in prod-
ucts of the metallurgy sector alone to shrink by 
1.5 million tons annually, which translates 
into losses of around US$ 9.5 million. This has 
forced the metallurgical plants of the Metin-
vest Group, which is owned by oligarch Rinat 
Akhmetov, to switch to transporting goods by 
rail to Black Sea ports in Mykolaiv and Ode-
sa to be able to process international orders. 
The turnover recorded by the Berdiansk sea 
port, for its part, shrank by 37% in 2017, which 
generated losses in many sectors of the local 
economy that depend on maritime transporta-
tion. According to estimates by Ukraine’s Min-
istry of Infrastructure, the total financial losses 
caused by shipping restrictions in the Strait of 
Kerch stand at around US$ 20 million annual-
ly, whereas indirect losses (for example, those 
connected with sea port employees losing their 
jobs) stand at US$ 40 million annually. Despite 
the fact that Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov 
recorded a 50% drop in the volume of shipped 
goods (from 17  663 million tons in 2013 to 
8912 million tons in 20174), which was due to 
the conflict in the eastern part of the country, 
revenue generated by this sector of the econo-
my continues to be an important contribution 
to Ukraine’s state budget5. 
Apart from losing control of the Strait of Kerch, 
Ukraine was also stripped of its ability to col-
lect so-called pilot fees and transit fees for the 
passage of merchant ships and warships. The 
resulting losses are estimated at several mil-
lion US dollars annually. Back in May 2017, Kyiv 
brought a case against Russia to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague concerning 
the Russian Federation’s violation of the Ukrain-
ian state’s right to use the resources located in 
4 Figures after: https://ports.com.ua. 
5 In terms of volume of trans-shipped goods, the port 
in Mariupol is ranked fifth, and the port in Berdiansk 
eighth among Ukraine’s sea ports. In 2016, the total 
revenue of Ukrainian sea ports stood at around US$ 1.7 
billion or around 2% of Ukraine’s GDP. Міністерство 
інфраструктури України, Стратегія розвитку 
морських портів України на період до 2038 року, 
https://mtu.gov.ua/files/
The construction and later the opening 
of the road traffic part of the bridge over 
the Strait of Kerch have considerably 
disrupted the traffic of merchant ships 
sailing to and from Ukrainian ports in the 
Sea of Azov.
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the territorial waters in the Sea of Azov, the 
Black Sea and the Strait of Kerch. The case con-
cerns depriving Ukraine of the possibility to use 
coastal infrastructure and sea reserves and at 
the same time illicit usage thereof by Russia. 
The accusation points to the illegal activity of 
Russian business entities in territories which be-
long to the Ukrainian state, including the con-
struction of a bridge in the Strait of Kerch6. 
Extraordinary security measures
The bridge connecting the Crimean Penin-
sula and the continental part of the Russian 
Federation has been covered by extraordi-
nary security measures, which confirms its 
strategic importance. A special task force 
composed of representatives of various min-
istries is working on ways to guarantee se-
curity of road and rail transportation, as well 
as the electricity network and the gas pipe-
line running through the Strait of Kerch. 
The team is trying to devise a comprehensive 
security system to include measures to counter-
act terrorist attacks from land, sea and air. For 
example, to protect the bridge a new system 
called “Penguin” is planned to be used, involving 
underwater drones capable of detecting divers 
and explosives, as well as a hydrolocation system 
emitting underwater acoustic impulses to deter 
individuals from approaching the bridge. Rus-
6 K. Nieczypor, For justice and compensation. Ukraine 
takes Russia to the international courts, ‘OSW Commen-
tary’, 11 June 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publik-
acje/osw-commentary/2018-06-11/justice-and-compen-
sation-ukraine-takes-russia-to-international 
sians cite the terrorist threat posed by Ukrainian 
saboteurs as the reason behind this large-scale 
and costly investment in the protection of the 
infrastructure in the Strait of Kerch. 
Providing immediate security to the bridge will 
be the task of the marine brigade of the Feder-
al Service for the National Guard Troops of the 
Russian Federation, which is ultimately to be sta-
tioned near the newly-built bridge. This unit is 
to be equipped with four type 21980 Gracho-
nok patrol boats intended for anti-sabotage and 
counter-terrorist activities. The brigade person-
nel will include specially-trained divers capable 
of protecting facilities of strategic importance. 
The newly-formed unit will also be given spe-
cial powers to ensure shipping security near the 
bridge. To this effect, in mid-May in the first 
reading Russian State Duma adopted a gov-
ernment-prepared bill authorising the National 
Guard to halt ships, haul them away to Russian 
ports and arrest members of their crew7.
Pressure as a tool to exert influence
In its actions, the Russian side mainly intends to 
target Ukraine’s economic interests. In late May 
2018, units of the FSB’s border guard operat-
ing in the region, which form a portion of the 
Black Sea coast guard8, were joined by three ar-
moured artillery cutters9. However, in contrast 
7 Until recently, the National Guard was only authorised 
to search vessels without detaining their crew mem-
bers, Законопроект об обеспечении безопасности 
акватории Крымского моста прошел первое чтение, 
‘Interfax’, 17 May 2018, http://www.interfax.ru/rus-
sia/613100
8 The coast guard of the Border Service of Russia’s FSB 
operating in the Black Sea region includes 16 warships, 
36 boats, 3 boats of special importance, 1 support ship 
and 4 patrol boats. Береговая охрана Пограничной 
службы ФСБ России – 2018, Russianships.info, http://
russianships.info/bohr/
9 Two type 1204 Shmel vessels and one type 1400 Grif 
vessel belonging to the Russian Caspian Flotilla have 
sailed from the marine military base in Astrakhan 
in the Caspian Sea to the base in Kerch in the Sea of 
Azov using the Volga–Don Canal. Н. Грищенко, Катера 
Каспийской флотилии усилили охрану Крымского 
моста, ‘Российская газета’, 29 May 2018, https://rg.
ru/2018/05/29/reg-ufo/katera-kaspijskoj-flotilii-usili-
li-ohranu-krymskogo-mosta.html
The commercial traffic limitations caused 
by the construction of the Crimean Bridge 
and by persistent checks organised by 
Russian border services are intended to 
aggravate Ukraine’s economic problems.
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to the opinions of some Ukrainian journalists 
and politicians, this should not be viewed as 
a harbinger of Russian military aggression10. 
These units are intended to operate in internal 
waters and will most likely be used as support 
by the FSB’s border guard that carries out inter-
vention and pursuit activities. This may suggest 
that Russia is willing to demonstrate its read-
iness to launch decisive measures should the 
conflict in the region escalate. Due to military 
weakness of Ukraine’s naval forces on the one 
hand11, and the operational potential of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet on the other, the ad-
vantage of the Russian military is sufficient to 
guarantee Russia’s full military dominance of 
the Sea of Azov’s basin12.
10 During his visit to Odessa, where in mid-July internation-
al military manoeuvres code-named Sea Breeze were 
held, the Ukrainian President said that he could not rule 
out the possibility that military aggression on Mariupol 
is the goal of Russia’s actions. Я. Миланова, Порошенко 
не исключает, что РФ готовит атаку на Мариуполь, 
‘Українська правда’, 16 August 2018, https://www.prav-
da.com.ua/rus/news/2018/07/16/7186465/. At the same 
time, Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister Olena Zerkal admit-
ted that the exacerbation of the situation in the Sea of Azov 
is being artificially created by the media, МЗС: Ситуація 
в Азовському морі – це штучно створене загострення, 
‘5 канал’, 20 July 2018, https://www.5.ua/polityka/
mzs-sytuatsiia-v-azovskomu-mori-tse-shtuchno-st-
vorene-zahostrennia-174125.html
11 It is estimated that as a result of Crimea’s annexation 
Ukraine’s Navy lost around 70% of its warships and naval 
fleet vessels. I. Kabanenko, The Ukrainian Navy: Conceptual 
Aspects and Cooperation With the West, ‘Eurasian Daily 
Monitor’, 9 March 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/
ukrainian-navy-conceptual-aspects-cooperation-west/ 
12 At present, no Ukrainian Navy warships are operating 
in the Sea of Azov. Vessels of the marine border service 
of Ukraine stationed in Mariupol are present there. They 
include one type 205P Tarantul warship, one modified 
fishing schooner, five Grif type cutters, five Kalkan type 
patrol boats and several small vessels of different types. 
Д. Попович, Азовский рубеж. Чем Украина может ответить 
России на возможное вторжение с моря, Focus.ua, 
27 June 2018, https://focus.ua/country/400766/
The unprecedented security measures imple-
mented to protect the Crimean Bridge and the 
boost in Russia’s military potential in the Sea 
of Azov confirm Moscow’s determination to as-
sume full control of this basin and turn it into 
a closed area. Any instances of Russia escalat-
ing the current tension may be interpreted as 
a method of raising the stakes in its negotia-
tions with Ukraine over the supplies of elec-
tricity and drinking water. Due to a blockade 
imposed by the authorities in Kyiv, Crimea has 
been affected by a shortage of these utilities 
for some time now. Russia’s actions in the Sea 
of Azov are of a durable nature and should be 
viewed as increasing the potential for putting 
pressure on Ukraine. The commercial traffic 
limitations caused by the construction of the 
Crimean Bridge and by persistent checks or-
ganised by border services are intended to 
aggravate Ukraine’s economic problems and 
thereby influence the mood of the general pub-
lic. By disrupting the operation of Ukrainian 
commercial ports, which is markedly affecting 
the financial situation of a large portion of res-
idents of south-eastern Ukraine, Russia intends 
to make Ukrainian society feel threatened and 
persuade it into believing that the government 
in Kyiv is incompetent and ineffective and that 
any attempts at a confrontation with the Rus-
sian Federation make no sense.
